The Republic of the Marshall Islands Maritime Administrator has released its report into the deaths of three crewmembers on bulk carrier Blue Cecil in 2023.
The vessel’s C/E, ETO and Fitter died after they were found unconscious inside of Cargo Hold No. 1. Despite a rescue attempt, with all three being recovered from the hold, they were unresponsive and did not respond to CPR. A post-mortem examination by the Philippine authorities determined their deaths was “asphyxia by suffocation.”
The following lessons learned were identified:
a) Entering a loaded cargo hold without authorization and without following established shipboard enclosed space entry and rescue procedures is extremely hazardous and should not be attempted.
b) Physical boundaries are critical for preventing unauthorized access into an enclosed space.
c) Enclosed space rescue procedures must be properly practiced and drills conducted as if they were a real emergency.
d) Stop-work authority can prevent marine casualties. For stop-work authority to be effective, crewmembers must not only be aware that they have this authority, but they must also have confidence that the authority is non-negotiable and can be exercised without fear of repercussion. They must also be as familiar with how to issue and respond to a stop-work action or instruction as they are with their other shipboard duties.
Summary of events:
On the afternoon of 8 December 2023, the Republic of the Marshall Islands-registered Blue Cecil was underway in the South China Sea. All cargo holds were laden with scrap metal. Work being done on deck included the C/E, ETO, and Fitter repairing a corroded electrical junction box located on the port side of the cross deck between Cargo Holds Nos. 1 and 2 while the Bosun and deck ratings were painting the main deck on the starboard side.
Prior to the afternoon coffee break, the C/E told the Bosun he was going to enter Cargo Hold No. 1 to get a welding cable and some other tools that had previously been left inside the cargo hold. The Bosun told the C/E that it was dangerous and that they should get permission from the Master before entering the cargo hold. The C/E replied they would go inside the cargo hold later. The Bosun observed the Fitter opening the booby hatch for Cargo Hold No. 1 as he and the C/E were talking. The Bosun reported smelling a strong odor after the booby hatch was opened.
The Bosun and deck ratings resumed work on deck after the coffee break. From where they were on deck, they were not able to see where the C/E, ETO, and Fitter had been working on the electrical junction box before the coffee break. The 2/E did not see the C/E, ETO, or Fitter and did not look for them when he went out on deck to check on the work being done on the electrical junction box after the coffee break was over. While in the Changing Room at the end of the workday, the Bosun determined that no one had recently seen the C/E, ETO, or Fitter.
The Bosun went out on deck with a flashlight and after not seeing the C/E, ETO, or Fitter on deck, he entered Cargo Hold No. 1 without telling the OOW or wearing an SCBA. While on the vertical ladder leading from the main deck to the upper platform, the Bosun saw light reflect from what he presumed were reflective patches on the missing crewmembers’ coveralls as he scanned with his flashlight. He went back on deck, raised the alarm, and then started removing the cleats for the cargo hold hatch cover so that it could be opened. A rescue was conducted per the ship’s enclosed space entry rescue plan and the C/E, ETO, and Fitter were removed from Cargo Hold No. 1 without further incident. All three were unresponsive when removed from the cargo hold. They did not respond to CPR and were subsequently determined to be deceased.
The Republic of the Marshall Islands Maritime Administrator’s marine safety investigation determined that the C/E, ETO, and Fitter had entered Cargo Hold No. 1 to recover the welding cable and other tools 9 without complying with the Company’s enclosed space entry procedures despite the Bosun’s prior warning to the C/E that it was dangerous and required permission from the Master.
Read the Blue Cecil report in full: Blue Cecil Marine Safety Investigation Report
