The Marine Department of the Hong Kong SAR has urged those within the shipping industry to take heed of lessons learnt following a collision of a vessel with a tugboat in the Suez Canal.
A Hong Kong registered liquefied gas carrier collided with a local tugboat during their northbound transit in the Suez Canal. The incident resulted in the sinking of the tugboat and the death of a crew member on board. This Note draws the attention of shipowners, ship managers, ship operators, masters, officers and crew to the lessons learnt from this accident.
The Incident
On the day of the accident, the sea was calm, and the visibility was good with southwesterly wind of Beaufort wind scale Force 3. A Hong Kong registered liquefied gas carrier (the vessel) was transiting northbound through the Suez Canal (SC) under the guidance of the pilot while a local tugboat (the tug), which was ahead of the vessel, was also sailing northbound in the SC.
As the tug was proceeding at a slower speed than the vessel, the distance between them was gradually shortened. Afterwards, a sudden vibration with an unusual noise was detected on board the vessel while the tug was heavily listed to one side and in half-sunken condition in the water. The tug finally sank. Six crew members of the tug were rescued by the local maritime rescue team and one crew member was missing. The body of the missing crew member was later found inside the tug.
The investigation identified that the contributory factors leading to the accident were that the vessel failed to comply with the requirements under the “Rules of Navigation” (RON) and Rule 5 of the COLREGS, i.e. to maintain a proper look-out at all times so as to make a full appraisal of the situation and of the risk of collision; the vessel failed to comply with the requirements stated in the RON, i.e. to overtake the tug only with the authorisation of the SC Authority, and to stop moving when the passage ahead was not clear; the master and the officers of the vessel in charge of the navigational watch failed to discharge their full duties in relation to safe navigation in the SC during pilotage according to the shipboard Bridge Procedure Manual (BPM); the vessel’s passage plan for navigating in the SC was not properly planned or fully implemented according to the shipboard BPM; and the tug failed to comply with the requirements stated in the RON, i.e. to take appropriate action to attract the vessel’s attention to avoid a collision when slowing down in the SC, and to avoid obstructing the vessel’s passage.
Lessons Learnt
In order to avoid recurrence of similar accidents in the future, the ship management company, all masters, officers and crew members should note items (a) to (d) to: (a) strictly comply with the requirements under Rule 5 of the COLREGS to maintain a proper look-out at all times during transiting in the SC so as to make a full appraisal of the situation and of the risk of collision; (b) strictly comply with the requirements stated in the RON to take appropriate action to ensure safe navigation in the SC, including overtaking another vessel only with authorisation, and stop moving when the passage ahead is not clear; (c) strictly comply with the requirements of the shipboard BPM and STCW Code3 in relation to safe navigation during pilotage, including taking appropriate action in the event of any doubt concerning the pilot’s action or intention; and (d) ensure the passage is properly planned with sufficient awareness of the requirements under the RON and is fully implemented as planned, especially on monitoring of traffic conditions and maintaining of proper look-out.
The Marine Department of the Hong Kong SAR has drawn the attention of shipowners, ship managers, ship operators, masters, officers and crew to the lessons learnt above of the collision of the vessel and tugboat.
