Lessons learned after fire sinks shrimp cutter

Germany’s Federal Bureau of Maritime Casualty Investigation (BSU) has published the lessons learned following the fire and subsequent foundering of a shrimp cutter vessel.

The exact cause of the fire could not be determined after the shipwreck was salvaged because of the extensive damage done to the vessel in the incident.

What happened?

In the early morning, a fire broke out in the engine room of an anchored shrimp cutter during a break in fishing. This was initially not noticed by the sleeping crew.

The main engine was running overnight to cool the fish hold, and the door to the engine room companionway was open for ventilation.

When the captain accidentally discovered the fire, the flames had already spread to the entire engine room and the open companionway, meaning that it was no longer possible for the crew to fight the fire with onboard resources. The crew of two left the burning cutter using a life raft and were rescued unharmed around an hour later. After the fire was later extinguished by external forces flown in, the cutter sank due to the progress of the fire and the entry of extinguishing agent. The water was contaminated by diesel fuel and hydraulic oil.

Why did it happen?

No anchor or fire watch. Both crew members were asleep and therefore did not notice the dangerous situation;

Lack of fire alarm system. It was not possible to alert the crew, so that the outbreak of the fire initially remained undetected;

Open door to the engine room companionway. The fire was probably able to spread more quickly due to a greater supply of oxygen;

Fire extinguishing system did not fulfil its purpose. Automatic activation of the system was not fitted, manual activation was not (or no longer) possible due to the location of the installation and the type and dimensions of the system were unsuitable for the engine room of the cutter;

Firefighting and emergency shutdown equipment located within the danger zone. The manual release of the extinguishing system, the fuel shut-off valves and other switches could no longer be reached;

Lack of emergency preparedness: regular safety drills and/or trainings were not customary. The crew was forced to act spontaneously and could not fall back on previously developed and practised emergency plans.

Read the full report, including lessons learned: BSU-Lessons_Learned_20.pdf

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