On the morning of 29 July 2021, the skipper of the UK registered potting vessel Pioneer (NN200) accidently entered the water as the vessel was heading back to its beach standing in Hastings, England. Pioneer’s sole deckhand was unable to pull him back on board and the skipper was later recovered from the water with the help of a rescue helicopter’s
winchman and airlifted to hospital, but he could not be revived.
The MAIB investigation found that Pioneer had a low bulwark at its aft deck, which did not prevent the skipper’s fall into the water. At the time of the accident neither the skipper nor deckhand were wearing a personal flotation device, although two were available on board.
Critical safety equipment was either missing, incorrectly fitted or out of date. There were no risk assessments held on board, emergency drills had not been practised and the skipper had not undertaken mandatory risk awareness training. Collectively, these deficiencies indicated that Pioneer was being operated with a low standard of safety management at the
time of the accident.
Pioneer held a Small Fishing Vessel Certificate; however, a post-accident inspection carried out by the Maritime and Coastguard Agency found 21 safety critical deficiencies, five of which had been recorded during the previous vessel inspection 8 months before the accident. The investigation concluded that the instructions to Maritime and Coastguard
Agency surveyors did not contain robust guidance to ensure that successive surveys were comparable and to a consistent standard.
Since the accident, the Maritime and Coastguard Agency has mandated that small fishing vessels have a minimum bulwark height of 1000mm and a means to recover an unconscious person from the water.
The MAIB has made a recommendation to the Maritime and Coastguard Agency to revise its guidance to surveyors to provide clear instructions on how to complete surveys and inspections, record the checklist used to identify findings and close out deficiencies.
Conclusions
Safety issues directly contributing to the accident that have been addressed or resulted in recommendations
1. The low bulwark around the aft deck offered little protection from falling overboard, and the skipper was not wearing a tethered safety harness to mitigate the risk of falling overboard.
2. The lack of an effective means of recovering an unconscious person and the absence of MOB drills impeded the deckhand’s ability to recover the skipper from the water.
Other safety issues directly contributing to the accident
1. The skipper’s fall into the water was not observed but could have been the result of the vessel’s movement, a slip or trip, or a non-fatal heart attack.
2. The skipper died because of immersion in the water leading to a heart attack and dry drowning.
3. The skipper was not wearing a PFD and it would have taken considerable effort to remain afloat in the developing swell.
4. The skipper had a pre-existing heart condition, which combined with the effect of cold water shock may have affected his ability to respond to this accident.
5. The skipper had not completed the Safety Awareness and Risk Assessment course and so may not have had a full appreciation of the risks associated with his vessel’s operation.
Safety issues not directly contributing to the accident that have been addressed or resulted in recommendations
1. The MCA’s inspection of the potting vessel Pioneer in November 2020 did not identify that the bulwark height around the stern of the vessel was inadequate or that the wheelhouse windows were semiopaque.
2. The inspection and survey guidance and close out of deficiencies for MCA surveyors did not result in the application of a consistent standard during these assessments.
Other safety issues not directly contributing to the accident
1. The effect of the delay in the receipt of the VHF “Mayday” call by the coastguard on the outcome of this accident cannot be known.
2. Pioneer’s wheelhouse windows were broken and semiopaque to the extent that all-round visibility was severely impaired, there were a number of trip hazards, and essential safety equipment was either out of date for service or missing. Collectively, these deficiencies indicated that the vessel was being operated with a low standard of safety management at the time of the accident.
Download the report: Pioneer (NN200) Fatal M.O.B Report
